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Abstract:  
Group agents can act, they can have knowledge. How should we 
understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In 
this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account faces two 
challenges: making sense of how large-scale distributed activities might be 
a kind of group action, and understanding the division of labour involved 
in group inquiry. In the first part of the paper, I argue that existing 
accounts of group action face problems dealing with large-scale group 
actions, and propose a minimal alternative account. In the second part of 
the paper, I draw on an analogy between inquiry and conversation, 
arguing that work by Robert Stalnaker and Craige Roberts helps us to 
think about the division of epistemic labour. In the final part of the paper 
I put the accounts of group action and inquiry together, and consider how 
to think about group knowledge, deep ignorance, and the different kinds 
of division of labour.  
 
Introduction1 
 Group agents do stuff: corporations avoid taxation, research teams 
publish their results, and running clubs compete in races. Group agents 
also know stuff: a corporation might know that its profits are decreasing, 
the ATLAS collaboration might know that the mass of the Higgs boson is 
such-and-such, and a running club might know that it stands a good 
chance of winning the six-stage relays. In this paper I want to connect these 
two topics, considering the nature of group inquiry: collective actions that 
aim at producing knowledge. Advances in communication as well as 
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increased centralised funding for research has allowed an explosion in 
large-scale collaborative work in science. Some recent notable examples 
include work in high energy physics,2 work on Climate change modelling,3 
the proof of the classification of simple finite groups,4 the mathematical 
tables project,5 the Polymath project,6 and a host of citizen science 
projects7.8 
 Group inquiry has a distinctive pattern of epistemic benefits and 
costs. When people pool their epistemic resources, they can increase their 
epistemic capacities and broaden their knowledge base, allowing them to 
take on intellectual tasks would be too time-consuming or complex for one 
person to take on.9 There is also evidence for a range of group-level 
epistemic effects that boost the reliability of group inquiry (intellectual 
diversity, transient diversity, and virtuous adversariality).10 However, 
group inquiry also comes with distinctive vices (polarisation, group think, 
and irreconcilable disagreement). Insofar as a normative epistemology 
should provide advice to inquirers ,11 social epistemology should be able 
                                               
2 (Knorr Cetina 1999). A collaboration between the CMS and ATLAS projects 
with around 5,000 authors currently holds the record for the paper with the 
most authors (Cho 2011), (Castelvecchi 2015) (Aad et al (ATLAS collaboration, 
CMS Collaboration), 2015) 
3 (Edwards 2013), (Winsberg 2018) 
4 (Steingart 2012) 
5 Historically the majority of the mathematical tables used in navigation, 
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(Campbell-Kelly, Croarken, Flood, and Robson 2003), (Grier 1998, 2003, 
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to offer advice for the design and practice of group inquiries, engaging 
with and critiquing the epistemic cultures of scientific research groups. My 
aim is to provide some theoretical groundwork for thinking about group 
inquiry as a precursor to this normative inquiry. 
 There are two central challenges to providing an account of group 
inquiry: 
1. The paradigm for understanding group actions has been small-
scale, co-operatives, and co-operative activities, but group inquiry 
is in many cases large-scale, distributed, and hierarchical. In order 
to understand these cases, we need an account of group action that 
can handle large-scale cases. 
2. Group actions typically involve a division of labour. Although we 
have a fairly good intuitive grip on the division of labour for actions 
like making a car or playing a piece of music, it is unclear how we 
should understand the division of labour involved in epistemic 
tasks.12  
 I will address these challenges in turn. First, I will offer an account 
of group action that is able to deal with the spectrum of cases from small-
scale co-operative actions like going for a walk, to large-scale distributed 
actions like running an election (section 1). Although minimal, this account 
will fix the central elements of group action. Secondly, I will present what 
I call the Stalnaker-Roberts model of conversation, which understands 
conversation as a kind of collaborative inquiry (section 2). This account 
gives us a set of fruitful theoretical tools for thinking about inquiry in 
general. In particular, I will argue that Roberts’ idea that we can make 
progress on a question by splitting it into subquestions gives us a natural 
                                               
12 The notion of the division of labour has a double life, occurring both in 
discussions of co-operation and market based competition. This double life 
traces back to Adam Smith’s argument that markets can deliver the benefits 
of planned specialised work (Smith 1776/1982). Many discussions of the 
division of epistemic labour focuses on benefits of competition (Kitcher 1990, 
Strevens 2003, Weisberg and Muldoon 2009). Our focus will be on the notion 
of the division of labour applied to co-operation (Muldoon 2018), but 
depending on one’s view about deal with invisible hand cases (see below), 
one might think of market mechanisms as a kind of group inquiry. 
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model for thinking about the division of epistemic labour. Putting the 
account of group action together with the Stalnaker-Roberts account of 
inquiry gives us an account of group inquiry that is answerable to both its 
epistemic and practical aspects (section 3). I will then draw out some 
consequences of the account for how we think about the relation between 
group inquiry and group knowledge (section 4),  deep ignorance (section 
5) and the different kinds of division of epistemic labour (section 6).13 
1.  Group Action 
When we think about group actions, it is natural to start with simple 
cases. In the literature we find many two-person cases: going for a walk 
(Gilbert 1990), painting a house (Bratman 1992), carrying a piano up the 
stairs (Tuomela and Miller 1988), and cooking a hollandaise sauce (Searle 
1990: 410-12). Methodologically this is sensible: in theory building it is 
nearly always a good idea to start with simple cases. (In the next section, I 
will pursue exactly this strategy). However, focusing on these examples 
runs the risk of skewing our philosophical imagination, leaving us without 
the tools for thinking about more complex cases. 
We can think about group actions as lying on a spectrum between 
small-scale and large-scale group actions. Small-scale actions  involve a small 
number of people working together on an activity together in a highly co-
operative way with a good deal of mutual awareness and common 
knowledge and without any significant power asymmetries. By contrast, 
large-scale actions  involve a large number of people working together on 
an activity in a highly distributed way with significant division of practical 
labour and with the participants knowing comparatively little about what 
each other are up to (or even who the other participants in the action are). 
                                               
13 One might think that group inquiry will just reduce to testimony, removing 
the need for a separate account of group inquiry. Something like this thought 
might motivate the centrality of testimony to social epistemology (Goldman 
1987, 1999, 2000, 2010), (Goldman and Blanchard 2016), (Goldberg 2016). 
While it is true that testimony is an important component of group inquiry, 
(Rossini and Porter 1979, Wagenknecht and Andersen 2013),  there are cases 
in which a group inquiry can successfully reach a conclusion, without any 
individual knowing that proposition (Bird 2010: 34), (De Ridder 2014), (Kukla 
Winsberg and Huebner 2017), (Huebner, Kukla, Winsberg 2018), which 
would not be possible if group inquiry were reducible to testimony. 
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Examples of large-scale group actions include producing pins in a 
workshop (Smith 1776/1982), writing a newspaper (Babbage 1832, 216, 
quoted in Shieber 2013: 276), campaigning to abolish slavery (Anderson 
2016), and a crew navigating a difficult route into harbour (Hutchins 1995).  
This distinction is not binary: there are a range of cases with different 
combinations of these characteristics. 
Existing accounts of group action are poorly positioned to make 
sense of large-scale group actions. Different accounts of group action face 
slightly different problems.  
Searle and Bratman claim that for a group to be intentionally V-ing, 
its active members must have plural intentions for the group to V (Searle 
1990), (Bratman 1992). It is easy to imagine participants in a large-scale 
action lacking suitable commitments to the group’s action: a pin-maker 
might just be indifferent to the group’s activity, solely concerned with 
earning a living, or be actively trying to undermine the group’s activity 
(they might be a spy from another workshop) (Shapiro 2014).14  
Tuomela and Miller (1998) appeal to a structure of mutual belief 
between the participants in a group action, requiring that each participant 
believes that others will do their parts.15 In large-scale cases, the 
participants may not know each other, or what the joint project is. In the 
Manhattan project a large group of people were involved in enriching 
Uranium, without even knowing what they were doing, let alone who the 
other participants were. In this kind of case each participant may perform 
their part of a joint action while suspending on whether the other 
participants will do their part.  
Gilbert (2009) claims that it is a condition on group action that the 
members form a so-called ‘plural subject’, where each member jointly 
commits to the activity of the group. This model applies to what we might 
                                               
14 In a response to Shapiro, Bratman concedes that his framework is not well 
suited to large-scale cases (Bratman 2014a: 333-5) 
15 Even in the individual case, it is questionable whether intending to V 
requires believing that you will V, or even that you will probably V (see 
Holton 2008). 
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call democratic groups, where a group intention must stem from the 
agreement of all members, but it is difficult to see how to apply it to 
hierarchical groups where a small set of operative members dictates the 
collective’s plan of action, or groups characterised by a division of labour 
where a plan splits the task into sub-tasks to be performed by individual 
agents (Bird 2014).16  
The distinction between small-scale and large-scale actions also 
applies to collective epistemic actions. We can think of conversation as our 
prototypical small-scale group epistemic action. Conversation typically 
involves just a few participants, a body of shared information, co-
operation on a strategy of inquiry, very little division of labour, and a flat 
power structure. By contrast, the examples of large-scale scientific 
collaboration we started off with involve more developed power 
structures, teams being split up into sub-teams in a hierarchical structure, 
limited shared information, and significant power asymmetries. If we 
work with existing accounts of group action, then we will not be able to 
give a fully general account of group inquiry.17 
I propose that we strip back our understanding of group action to a 
minimal account that focuses on the central properties of group action, 
allowing  that these properties can be realised in different ways. There is a 
great deal of disagreement about the analysis of intentional action, but it is 
common ground in this debate that intentional action involves an agent’s 
action which is explained by the mental state of intention.18 This gives us 
the following minimal account: 
                                               
16 Gilbert (2006: C8) defends the possibility of large, disjointed plural subjects, 
characterised by impersonality, anonymity, and hierarchy. This does not 
demonstrate that her account can deal with large-scale group actions. It might 
well be possible for large groups to be characterised by certain ‘thin’ joint 
commitments (such as the commitment to obey a set of social norms), but this 
does not establish that all large-scale groups have the rich commitments 
required by joint action on the plural subject account. 
17 For an example of this problem, see (Tossut 2014). Tossut uses a Bratman-
inspired account of scientific collaboration, meaning that her account claims 
that collective knowledge requires agreement and shared epistemic goals 
amongst the members of the group (Tossut 2014: 361)  
18 The action-intention connection (iii) is often associated with what Bratman 
calls the simple view, which claims that intentionally V-ing requires an 
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MINIMAL-INDIVIDUAL: An agent S is intentionally V-ing iff i) S 
is V-ing ii) S intends to V, and iii) condition i) obtains because of ii). 
 I want to leave things at this fairly abstract level, making no 
commitments about the nature of action, intention, or the explanatory 
relation involved.19 The point is that if there is collective action, then these 
functional properties will be realised by groups. This suggests the 
following minimal account on group intentional action: 
MINIMAL-GROUP: An group G is intentionally V-ing iff i) 
members of G are either V-ing or performing sub-tasks of V, ii) G 
intends to V, and iii) condition i) obtains because of ii). 
 This account claims that a group action is constituted by a bunch of 
individual actions which are explained (in some suitable sense) by a 
collective plan or intention.  
Condition i) takes the individual action condition in MINIMAL-
INDIVIDUAL and replaces it with a requirement that members of the 
group be performing suitable actions: either the action being performed by 
the group, or suitable sub-activities.20 A team of removers might move a 
piano from A to Z either by all moving the piano from A to Z together, or 
by one agent moving the piano from A to B, the next moving it from B to 
C and so on. This  expresses the idea that a group can only act by means of 
                                               
intention to V (Bratman 1987: C8). I mean the connection to be compatible 
with intentionally V-ing being explained by the intention to do something 
else. 
19 A sense of the options. Actions might be: events, states, or processes. 
Intentions might be a species of belief, a species of knowledge, or a sui generis 
mental state. The explanatory connection might be causal, non-causal, 
teleological, or a kind of reasons explanation. The direction of explanation 
between intentional action and these conditions might go either way, either 
offering a reductive account which explains intentional action in terms of 
intention, action, and action-explanation, or an action-first account which 
explains intention, action, and action-explanation in terms of intentional 
action (Levy 2013). 
20 We will need to understand ‘sub-task’ in a capacious sense to allow that 
groups that groups with incorrect means-ends beliefs are still engaged in the 
relevant activities. 
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its members acting, meaning that there is no group-level basic action 
(Searle 1990: 410, Lackey 2014). 
Condition ii) requires that the actions of individuals must be 
accompanied by a collective intention. Exactly what intentions are at the 
individual case is contested. Nonetheless, the literature on individual 
intentions suggests a broad functional characterisation of group 
intentions. A group intention is a state that is: i) the characteristic output 
of collective practical deliberation, ii) that will (typically) dispose a group 
to either V, or to take plausible means to V-ing, iii) that requires the group 
to form appropriate means-ends intentions, and not to form incompatible 
plans’ (Bratman 1987), and iv) that requires that the group has knowledge 
of how to carry out its plans (Habgood-Coote 2017).21  
Condition iii) connects individual action with group intention, 
expressing the idea there needs to be a collective plan that explains the 
pattern of individual-level actions (see Tuomela and Miller 1988: 369-70, 
Searle 1990: 402-3). Exactly how to understand the explanatory relation 
between action and intention is a difficult question but for our purposes 
we can work with an intuitive understanding of it.  
This account is deliberately non-committal about the nature of action, 
intentions, and action explanation (see footnote 18). This means that it 
leaves open a number of difficult questions, including how to think about 
uncooperative participants, and whether invisible hand cases involve 
collective action. I suggest that the answers to these questions will depend 
on one’s views of the components of intentional action. 
Depending on how one thinks about the explanatory relation 
between group intention and individual action, MINIMAL-GROUP is 
compatible with individuals being part of a group action without 
intending for the collective’s action to be successful, or even whilst 
                                               
21 The idea that group intention is the output of group level deliberations 
means that we need to eschew a pure judgement aggregation approach to 
group intention, which would entail that a group’s intentions at a time 
supervenes on its (operative) members’ intentions at that time. In addition to 
looking to the relation between group and individual mentality, we need to 
pay attention to the way groups mental lives develop over time. 
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intending that the collective fail. A worker in a factory making cars may 
perform her tasks because she has been told to, although she is indifferent 
to whether the factory makes cars. A participant in a citizen science project 
may categorise galaxies because she likes playing free computer games, 
although she couldn’t care less about the project’s scientific aims. A 
saboteur in the factory might be performing the normal duties of a factory-
worker whilst intending that no cars are made. A participant in a citizen 
science project may miscategorise galaxies to hamper the project. In each 
of these cases, there is a case to be made that the individual actions can be 
explained by the group’s intention in the sense of explanation relevant to 
intentional action. In the factory worker case, the manager’s commands 
embody the plans of the group, and the worker does follow those 
commands, meaning that the worker’s actions are in a sense explained by 
the group’s intention. If we want to explain why the participant in the 
citizen science project is classifying galaxies, we would need to appeal to 
the fact that the online game was disseminated by a scientific project with 
certain epistemic aims. In the saboteur cases, we could explain the 
sabotaging actions by citing the group’s intention (although we would also 
need to cite the saboteurs’ disruptive intentions). In each of these cases the 
there is also a case to be made that individuals’ intentions are not explained 
by the group’s intention in the way distinctive of intentional action. 
Perhaps these explanations are merely causal, and should be distinguished 
from action-explanations. If we take this line then the indifferent an 
saboteurs are not part of the collective agent, and are more like tools for the 
collective action.  
MINIMAL-GROUP is also neutral on whether ‘invisible hand’ cases 
in which a group of agents pursuing a variety of aims brings about some 
unintended consequence count as cases of group action (see footnote 11). 
If we allow that a group intention can supervene in a complex way on a 
body of individual intentions with different contents, and that the kind of 
explanation involved in intentional action is causal, then invisible hand-
type groups might be engaged in group actions. By contrast, if we think 
that group intentions either require individual intentions with the same 
content, a group-level process of deliberation, or that action explanation is 
distinctive, then this kind of group will turn out not to be engaged in group 
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action (Searle 1990). This issue is important in the context of thinking about 
group inquiry, since if the invisible hand creates group agents, prediction 
markets, scientific disciplines, and democratic societies will turn out to be 
engaged in group inquiry.22  
The aim of MINIMAL-GROUP is to provide an account of group 
action that is sufficiently general to cover both small-scale and large-scale 
cases. In small-scale actions, the group’s plan may be determined by the 
participants agreeing on a plan, which they all commit to acting out, 
leading them to perform suitable sub-activities because of their collective 
plan. By contrast, in a large-scale action, the plan may be determined 
unilaterally by the leaders of the group or by some decision-making 
procedure, and the participants in the group may perform their tasks 
because their managers have told them to. In both cases, we find a pattern 
of individual actions which are animated and explained by a group-level 
plan, but the way in which the collective intention is realised differs 
dramatically. In small-scale actions, the participants will take the cognitive 
load associated with an intention onto their own shoulders, with each 
participant engaging with the deliberative process, thinking about 
whether the plan is possible, about how it might be performed, and trying 
to resolving any tensions between the various plans the group might have, 
as well as actually carrying out the relevant action. In this kind of case, we 
will find a fairly close alignment between the group’s intention, and the 
participants’ intentions. (We may find that in these cases the conditions 
proposed by Searle, Bratman, Tuomela and Miller, or Gilbert are sufficient 
for group intention). By contrast, in large-scale cases, the bundle of 
functional properties distinctive of intention will be distributed across the 
various members of the group. There may be one team that decides what 
the group will do, another that checks whether the plan is compatible with 
the group’s beliefs, and further groups that determine how the plan will 
be carried out, resolve any tensions between the group’s plans, and 
actually carry out the group’s plan. This kind of division of labour across 
the functional properties distinctive of intention allows for considerable 
                                               
22 On ’invisible hand’ explanations in science, see (Hull 1997), (Kitcher 1993), 
(Wray 1999), (Strevens 2003), (Zollman 2018) 
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divergences between the group’s intentions and the intentions of 
participants within the action. 
2. Conversation  
Let’s start our investigation of group inquiry with the simplest  joint 
epistemic action: a conversation between two agents. An important thread 
of work in pragmatics, tracing back to  Robert Stalnaker and Craige 
Roberts, uses the idea that conversation is a kind of collaborative inquiry 
to explain a range of linguistic phenomena. The goal of this section is to 
unpack the core of this framework, and use it to understand the division 
of epistemic labour involved in group inquiry.23 The Stalnaker-Roberts 
model involves various idealisations, and we should not expect every 
feature of this model to be reflected in conversations or bigger group 
inquiries.24 
  The core of the Stalnaker-Roberts model is a picture of conversation 
as a game. This game involves three kinds of moves: assertion, asking, and 
directing. These moves are associated with different grammatical moods, 
different kinds of content25, and different effects on the conversational 
scoreboard (Lewis 1979). 
 Start with assertion. Following Stalnaker (1999) we assume that the 
participants in a conversation start with a set of propositions which they 
take for granted for the purposes of that conversation. The acceptance of 
these propositions is taken to be a matter of common belief, and they are 
represented on the conversational scoreboard by a set of propositions 
which make up the common ground.26 The intersection of the common 
                                               
23 For presentations of this framework, see (Stalnaker 1999 especially chapter 
4), (Stalnaker 2014), (Roberts 2012, 2018) 
24 This is a general problem for philosophy of language, see (Cappelen and 
Dever 2019, Beaver and Stanley MS) 
25 Exactly how to think about the content of declaratives, interrogatives, and 
imperatives is a vexed question. I’ll use a possible worlds framework and 
associated interrogatives and imperatives with non-propositional contents. 
Other approaches are available. 
26 Gilbert and Priest argue that the combination of acceptance and common 
belief associated with the propositional attitude of presupposing is close to 
Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment, suggesting that we might model the 
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ground propositions is the context set. In a possible worlds framework 
where we think of a proposition as a set of possible worlds, we can think 
about each proposition in the common ground as ruling out the worlds in 
which the proposition is false, meaning that the context set is the set of 
worlds which we consider to be possible for the purposes of 
conversation.27 The basic way to manipulate the common ground is by 
asserting: uttering a sentence in the declarative mood expressing a 
proposition, thereby proposing to add that proposition to the common 
ground.  If I utter the sentence ‘Tahlia came to the party’, I express the 
proposition Tahlia came to the party, and propose to add this proposition to 
the common ground. If this assertion is unchallenged, we add the 
proposition to the common ground and shrink the context set, ruling out 
the worlds in which Tahlia didn’t come to the party. 
 Next, asking. Conversations typically have topics which constrain 
what we can say. If we are talking about where to go to dinner, I’ll get 
annoyed if you start offering hot-takes on Lithuanian politics. We can 
represent the topic of a conversation by adding questions under discussion 
to the scoreboard (Roberts 2012), which represent the questions that the 
participants in a conversation are committed to answering. As I will use 
the term, questions are entities on the same level as propositions that are 
expressed by interrogative sentences and are associated with the speech act 
of asking.28 On a possible worlds approach, we can think of a question as a 
set of sets of possible worlds corresponding to the possible answers to that 
question. Following Roberts, I will treat this answer set as a set of exhaustive 
answer propositions, meaning that these sets of worlds are mutually 
incompatible, and that a question is a partition over a portion of logical 
space.29  
                                               
common ground as a set of collective beliefs (Gilbert 1989: 294-8, Gilbert and 
Priest 2013).  
27 We might worry that the notion of the common ground introduces a level of 
co-ordination which is incompatible with highly distributed inquiries. We 
return to this issue in section 3. 
28 I will put interrogatives in quotes, and italicise questions. The sentence ‘who 
came to the party?’ expresses the question who came to the party?. 
29 Here is a recipe for generating Roberts-style partitions (Roberts 2012: 6:9-
6:12). Start with an interrogative phrase: ‘who came to the party?’. Split it into 
two parts: the wh-word — ‘who’ — which we treat as a variable, and the 
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 Asking is a proposal to add a question to the set of questions under 
discussion. If the proposal is accepted, two things happen: we add a new 
partition to the scoreboard, giving us a new range of alternatives to 
distinguish between, and we commit to trying to answer the question. If I 
utter the sentence ‘who came to the party?’ I thereby propose to add who 
came to the party? to the questions under discussion, meaning that we add 
the following partition to set of worlds in the context set: 
Figure 1: Questions 
Question: Who came to the party? 
Domain: Ann, Bernard. 
Key: A: Ann came; a: Ann did not come; B: Bernard came; b: Bernard 
did not come. 
Options: {{AB}; {Ab}; {aB}; {ab}} 
                                               
question abstract — ‘came to the party’ — which expresses a property. Take 
the salient domain, including the restriction triggered by the question word, 
and generate all of the possible complete assignments of the property to the 
objects in the domain. If our domain is just Ann and Bernard, then the 
complete assignments of the property came to the party will be: 
 
i) Ann and Bernard came 
ii) Ann came, and Bernard didn’t come 
iii) Ann didn’t come, and Bernard came 
iv) Ann and Bernard didn’t come 
 
Each of these assignments is a complete answer to the question. In this case 
the interrogative carries the presupposition that there in fact was a party, so 
the partition only divides up the portion of logical space where there was a 
party.  
14 
Furthermore, we commit to trying to resolve the question by ruling 
out all of the false answers.30 
 Finally, consider directive moves.31 Directive moves are associated 
with sentences in the imperatival mood, which we can think of as 
expressing an action directed toward the addressee (Portner 2007, 2018).32 
If I utter the sentence ‘stand up!` addressing Trey, then I express the action 
standing up, directed towards Trey. Directive acts are proposals for the 
addressee to change their intentions, meaning that we can represent their 
conversational effects by adding a To-Do list of explicit intentions to the 
scoreboard (Portner 2007). Since accepting a question into the set of 
questions under discussion involves a commitment to resolve the 
question, asking a question involves adding both a question to the 
question-stack, and the commitment to resolve it to the To-Do list. The 
combination of intentions to answer questions on the To-Do list will 
constitute a group’s plan of inquiry, which will represents both the 
questions they are investigating, and how they plan to resolve them. 
 Our discussion gives us a three-fold categorisation of 
conversational moves, with associated moods, content, and changes to the 
conversational scoreboard: 
                                               
30 What about practical questions? Three options: i) Treat the cells in a practical 
question as propositions about the way the world could be, and think of 
answering a practical question as deciding which proposition to make true. ii) 
Treat the cells as propositions about which actions an agent all things 
considered ought to do, meaning that answering involves forming a belief 
about one ought to do. iii) Extend the semantics for interrogatives, allowing 
questions which are partitions of possible actions and for questions to be 
answered by forming intentions (See Roberts 2009).  
31 I am construing ‘directive’ broadly, to include commands, advice, 
permissions, suggestions, and warnings.  
32 This is a simplification of Portner’s view, which involves multiple To-Do lists 
indexed to different modal flavours (i.e. commands, advice, warnings). For 
Roberts’ development of Portner’s view, see (Roberts 2018: 338-329). 
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The conversational scoreboard corresponds to the conversational 
dispositions that the speakers take one another to have.33 For a proposition 
to be in the common ground, the participants need to both be taking that 
proposition for granted, and believe that they are so doing so. For a 
question to be included in the questions under discussion, participants 
need to commit to resolving that question and believe that they are doing 
so. If the participants in a conversation fail to co-ordinate their attitudes 
they will end up in a defective context (Stalnaker 1999: 85). Representing 
defective contexts and their resolution is a substantial issue in pragmatics, 
and accounts of group inquiry should also be able to represent inquiries 
with defective epistemic backgrounds.34 
 With this picture of the basic moves in a conversation in place, we 
can tell a story about how conversational moves contribute to answering 
the question under discussion. There are four basic ways participants can 
make progress on a question: i) by asserting a complete answer, ii) by 
asserting a partial answer, iii) by asserting a casual answer or iv) by asking 
other relevant questions. In the remainder of this section, we will run 
through these ways of making progress in inquiry, introducing relevant 
concepts along the way. 
                                               
33 Translated to Gilbert’s idiom we might think that the conversational 
scoreboard consists of the propositions, inquisitive and non-inquisitive goals 
which the participants in a conversation are jointly committed to for the 
purposes of a conversation (see footnote 25). 
34 Explaining defective group inquiries is a question for another day, but see 
section 5 for a way one might represent disagreement about the question 
under investigation. 
Move Mood Content Effect on Scoreboard 
Asserting Declarative Proposition Add proposition into common ground. 
Asking Interrogative Question 
Add question to the questions under 
discussion, and add answering the question 
to the to-do list. 
Directing Imperative Property 
Add task corresponding to property to the 
to-do list. 
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 As we are thinking of things, a question is a set of mutually 
exclusive alternatives, meaning that we can think about making progress 
on a question in terms of ruling out possible answers. A complete answer 
rules out all but one of the possible answers, and a partial answer rules out 
at least one of the possible answers (Roberts 2012). Returning to our 
example above: the proposition A and B came is a complete answer to the 
question who came to the party? because it rules out all but one cell in the 
partition, and the proposition A came is a partial answer because it rules 
out at least one answer to the question. We can define partial and complete 
answers as follows: 
Complete Answer: A proposition p is a complete answer to a 
question Q1 iff p rules out all but one cell in the partition associated 
with Q1. 
Partial Answer: A proposition p is a partial answer to a question Q1 
iff p rules out at least one of the cells in the partition associated with 
Q1.  
 Partial answers can be combined to yield a complete answer to a 
question. If we put together the partial answers A came and B came, we rule 
out all of the cells except A and B came, giving us a complete answer. 
One can make progress on a question by asserting a proposition that 
entails a answer to the question when supplemented by propositions in 
the common ground (Roberts 2012: 6:12). If the common ground includes A 
came iff there was beer, asserting there was beer at the party entails a partial 
answer: A came. One can also make progress by asserting a proposition 
which would entail a partial answer when put together with accessible 
information.35 Even if A came iff there was beer isn’t yet in the common 
ground, asserting there was beer at the party might still be helpful because 
the information about A’s alcoholic proclivities might be accessible. This 
gives us weaker notions of complete and partial answerhood: 
                                               
35 Information is accessible to an agent if she has the capacity to get hold of that 
information (say by perception, inference, or testimony). That a piece of 
information is accessible does not entail that it is easy to get hold of. 
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Casual Complete Answer: A proposition p is a casual complete 
answer to a question Q1 iff there is some  accessible proposition q 
and (p &q) rules out all but one cell in the partition associated with 
Q1. 
Casual Partial Answer: A proposition p is a casual partial answer 
to a question Q1 iff there is some accessibly proposition q, and (p&q) 
rules out at least one of the alternatives in the partition associated 
with Q1. 
 We can also make progress on a question by asking more questions. 
In many cases the partition associated with an interrogative phrase will be 
extremely complex and difficult for the participants to deal with. One way 
that we can deal with this is by overlaying a complex partition with 
simpler partitions that divide the same area of logical space into fewer 
cells. We might replace the question who came to the party? with the simpler 
questions whether A came? and whether B came? giving us two simple yes-
no questions to consider.  
Figure 2: Subquestions 
Subquestion 1: Whether Ann came to the party? 
Options: {{AB; Ab};{aB; ab}} 
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Subquestion 2: Whether Bernard came to the party? 
Options:  {{AB; aB};{Ab; ab}} 
 
Let’s call the relation between complex and simpler questions the 
question-subquestion relation: 
Question-Subquestion Relation: A question Q1 is a sub-question 
of Q2 iff every complete answer to Q2 entails a partial answer to Q1. 
(see Roberts 2012: 6:6-6:7). 
 Answering a sub-question of a question will be helpful because the 
propositions which completely answer the sub-question will be partial 
answers to the initial question, meaning that completely answering a 
subquestion will partially answer the question.  
There will also be a casual version of the question-sub-question 
relation indexed to accessible information. The question was there beer at 
the party? is a casual sub-question of the question who came to the party? 
because complete answers to the first question together with accessible 
propositions about the presence of beer entail partial answers to the second 
question. We can define this relation as follows: 
Casual Question-Subquestion Relation: A question Q1 is a casual 
sub-question of Q2 iff for every proposition p which is a complete 
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answer to Q2 there is some accessible proposition q, such that (p 
and q) entails a partial answer to Q1.  
 The question-subquestion relation is important because it gives us 
a tool for thinking about the mereology of questions. The sub-questions of 
a question are part of that question, answering a sub-question gives part of 
the answer to the initial question, and knowing the answer to a subquestion 
entails knowing in part what the answer to the initial question is.36 This 
part-whole structure is crucial to inquiry. When we face a particularly 
complex question, we may need to form an plan of inquiry that splits the 
initial question up into various subquestions which we can address in turn. 
These subquestions may themselves have enough structure to allow 
subquestions, leaving us with a hierarchically organised stack of questions 
to be resolved.  
Forming plans of inquiry is an important tool for cognitively limited 
inquirers. Splitting a question into sub-questions both helps us see how 
information bears on a complex question, and allows us to divide up our 
intellectual labour across time and between people. In general, we can 
think of the division of labour as the process whereby a complex task is 
split up into simpler subtasks, which can be performed separately either 
at different times or by different people. We now have a way to think about 
the tasks and subtasks involved in inquiry: the subtasks of an inquiry into 
some question Q will be inquiries into subquestions of Q. These subinquiries 
may be divided up across time, in a sequential process of resolving 
subquestions. Or they may be divided up interpersonally, with different 
members of a group inquiring into different subquestions. Consider the 
way in which a team of detectives might organise to investigate a murder. 
Rather than all inquiring  into who committed the murder? they might decide 
to split up, with different detectives considering questions like who had a 
motive?, what does the forensic evidence show?, did A murder the victim?, and 
so on. To put the point in our idiom: the detectives collectively inquire into 
                                               
36 For a discussion of the relation between knowledge and the parts of 
questions see Pavese (2017). 
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the big question who committed the murder? by individually investigating 
its subquestions because of a collective inquisitive plan. 
 To summarise: the Stalnaker-Roberts account provides us with a 
number of ideas that are essential to understanding group inquiry. The 
central idea is that inquiry involves a process of ruling out potential 
answers to a question. Around this, they build an account of the rational 
structure of inquiry. The question-subquestion relation helps us to think 
about the kind of planning involved in inquiry, and helps us to understand 
the division of epistemic labour involved in group inquiry. The idea that 
inquiry aims at resolving questions also gives us a picture of the success-
conditions of inquiry, telling us that an inquiry is successful when it 
reaches a complete answer to a question.37 In the next section, we will put 
these ideas to work to develop an account of group inquiry. 
3. Group Inquiry 
Applying the minimal account of group action from §1 to group 
inquiry gives us this schematic account: 
MINIMAL-GROUP INQUIRY: A group G is inquiring into question 
Q iff i) the members of G are either inquiring into Q, or performing 
suitable subtasks, ii) G has an intention to inquire into Q, iii) 
condition i) obtains because of the group’s intention. 
We are now in a position to fill in this account, using concepts from 
the Stalnaker-Roberts account of conversation. 
We can use our account of the division of epistemic labour to 
understand the subtasks involved inquiry, meaning that the subtasks of  
inquiring into some question Q will be inquiries into subquestions of Q.  
Roberts’ picture of plans of inquiry also helps us to see what kinds of 
intentions will be involved in inquiry. An intention to answer a question 
                                               
37 Often we will be satisfied with partial answers. If I ask how to skin a cat, I 
will be happy with just one way. To make sense of this fact, we might 
introduce the notion of a resolving answer: an answer that gives sufficient 
information to satisfy the practical and epistemic interests of the speaker(s). 
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will involve both an aim—answering a particular question—and a plan for 
achieving that aim, in the form of an ordered set of subquestions of that 
question, and an allocation of subquestions to members of the group.  
To help us think about the distinction between the aims and the 
means-ends structure of inquisitive intentions, let’s introduce a distinction 
between object questions and methodological questions. An object question is 
the question that the group aims to resolve, and the methodological 
question is the practical question of how they will resolve that question. 
The object question is a set of propositions about the subject-matter under 
investigation (only one of which will be true), and the methodological 
question is a set of alternative strategies of inquiry by which the group 
might investigate the object question, (only some of which will be 
potentially successful).38 If the object question is whether p?, the object 
question will be how shall we answer whether p?. These two questions are 
intimately related, although neither is a subquestion of the other. Forming 
an intention to investigate some question immediately raises the question 
of how to resolve that question; just as forming an intention to do 
something immediately raises the question of how to do that thing. 
Answering a question will often involve an intertwined process of 
answering both object and methodological questions, just as action often 
involves an intertwined process of doing something and working out how 
to do it see (AUTHOR). And, we might think that knowing an answer to 
the object question may requires agreement on a possible answer to the 
methodological question.39 
                                               
38 In a partition framework how to answer whether p? gives a set of cells which 
are complete applications of the predicate is a way to answer whether p to all of 
the methods in the salient domain. This means that a complete answer will be 
a proposition that tells us which exactly which ways are ways to answer the 
question whether p? and which are not. As with many infinitival questions, in 
this case we favour the mention-some reading, allowing a partial answer to 
count as a resolving answer. We only require a partial answer which gives a 
positive application of the predicate is a way to answer the question whether p? 
to one method in the domain.  
39 What happens when some members of a group think that a method is a way 
to answer the object question, and others disagree? Some options: Lackey’s 
account of group justification claims if adding up the bases of justified beliefs 
doesn’t yields a coherent belief set, a group belief can’t be justified, making 
methodological disagreement something like a higher-order defeater for 
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With this framework in place, we can sketch the structure of group 
inquiry. 
We start with a group of agents who are investigating a question: say 
whether p?. With simple questions, a group can investigate by forming a 
collective intention to resolve the question by means of one person finding 
out the answer. However, with more complex questions it might not be 
possible for an individual to resolve the question. Some questions are 
laborious, requiring a huge amount of epistemic labour (think of 
complicated but mundane calculations). Other questions are specialised, 
requiring the combination of multiple bodies of expert knowledge or skills 
which are not possessed by any individual (think of a question in sociology 
that requires ethnographic skills to collect the data and statistical methods 
to analyse it).40 When a group faces a question which is laborious or 
specialised, they will need to switch to the methodological question, and 
agree on a plan of inquiry that addresses the complexity of the object 
question. A successful strategy of inquiry will involve splitting the object 
question up into relevant subquestions, assigning these subquestions to 
members of the group in line with their epistemic capacities, and 
determining an order to resolve them. With a suitable division of epistemic 
labour in place, the individual members of the group can get on with the 
subinquiries, by finding out new information, or by making inferences 
from their standing knowledge. In many cases the inquiries into the 
subquestions of the object question will themselves be undertaken by 
groups of agents, giving rise to further levels of the division of labour. 
 When the subinquiries of some question are complete, there will be 
a further stage in which the answers to the subquestions are collated to 
give a complete answer to the object question. This final stage may be 
carried out by an individual who understands the partial answers, in 
which case the inquiry will wind up with the collator knowing the 
complete answer to the object question. However, in other cases the 
collation may be done automatically (as in Tollefsen’s UN population 
                                               
collective knowledge (Lackey 2016). Dang argues that methodological 
disagreement can enhance group justification (Dang forthcoming). 
40 On this distinction, see (Hardwig 1991: 695, De Ridder 2014: 46, Wagenkechet 
2014) 
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study case (Tollefsen 2007: 31, Lackey 2014: 289)), may be done by someone 
who does not understand the partial answers (as in Bird’s interdisciplinary 
modus ponens case (Bird 2010: 34)), or may merely involve papers being 
published in suitable journals or repositories (Bird 2010: 35-36). In these 
cases the collation of answers may be successful without any individual 
coming to know the complete answer to the object question, leading to 
group knowledge of a proposition which no individual knows. 
Putting together our understanding of the task-subtask structure of 
inquiry, our picture of inquisitive intentions, and the idea that group action 
must involve group members’ actions being explained by a collective 
intention, we get the following account of group inquiry: 
 GROUP INQUIRY 
 A group G is inquiring into a question Q iff 
i) Some of the members of G are either inquiring into Q, or inquiring 
into subquestions Q1, Q2 … Qn of Q; 
ii) G has an intention to inquire into Q in accordance with a strategy 
of inquiry S; 
iii) The active members of G are engaged in their sub-inquiries 
because of the group’s inquisitive intention. 
Since it is built on MINIMAL-GROUP, this account inherits its central 
features, and leaves open the same choice points. 
GROUP INQUIRY is neutral on whether a participant in a group 
action needs to intend the success of the group’s activity. A scientist in a 
very hierarchical laboratory might well be part of a project to answer some 
question, but be indifferent to finding out the answer, or even intend to 
sabotage the project. Whether they are part of the inquiry is a difficult 
question which turns on how we understand action-explanation. This 
account also leaves open the possibility of ‘invisible hand’ cases counting 
as group inquiries, with the possibility that scientific disciplines (Gilbert 
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2000, Weatherall and Gilbert 2016), or even science as a whole (Bird 2010) 
might count as one giant collective inquiry (Wray 2007). 
This account covers both small and large-scale group inquiries. The 
basic structure of the account is built from the Stalnaker-Roberts account 
of conversation, meaning that the account predicts that any conversation 
counts as a group inquiry. In such cases, a group’s inquisitive intention will 
be realised by closely related individual intentions. The account also has 
the resources to explain how many agents working together in a complex 
institution might be part of one inquiry. We can say that the ATLAS and 
CMS projects at CERN are group inquiries, because all the participants in 
these projects are pursuing their inquiries because of a collective plan to 
answer questions about fundamental physics.  
One crucial difference between small and large-scale inquiries 
concerns the role of the conversational scoreboard. When just a few agents 
are investigating a relatively simple question, it is feasible for all of the 
participants to keep track of contributions to the inquiry, meaning that 
what is on the scoreboard can be a matter of common knowledge. 
However, as questions increase in complexity, just keeping track of 
contributions becomes a complex task. It would be simply inefficient for a 
massive collaborative project to maintain a co-ordinated common ground 
and stack of questions under discussion. Instead, I suspect that we will find 
that the work keeping the score of an investigation will be distributed 
across different participants. A central planning committee might keep 
track of the answer to the methodological question, with smaller groups 
keeping track of progress in their respective sub-inquiries, and collators 
pulling together the partial answers that issue from the subinquiries to 
resolve the object question. 
One might worry that the lack of a co-ordinated scoreboard 
undermines the analogy between conversation and group inquiry. I don’t 
think we should take this worry too seriously. Recall Lewis’ idea that the 
conversational scoreboard is analogous to the score in a baseball game 
(Lewis 1979). Some games involve all of the players keeping the score 
together. All of the players in a game of pick-up basketball might take 
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responsibility for keeping the score. However, in professional games 
keeping the score is a distinct task, which may itself be subdivided into 
roles like referee and linesperson. Similarly, in a group inquiry keeping 
track of the score will be a specialised task. This task might be performed 
by a specialised group or it can be split into subtasks and distributed 
between different participants.41 
4. Group Inquiry and Group Knowledge 
There is a close connection between inquiry and knowledge. It is 
plausible that ignorance is the norm of inquiry (Whitcomb 2017), and that 
knowledge is both the central aim and the success condition of inquiry 
(Williamson 2000), (Kelp 2014). When a group agent inquires into some 
question by employing a division of labour into suitable subquestions 
which are then collated to resolve the question, the product of this process 
will be that the group knows the answer to the object question. This 
connection raises the issue of what consequences GROUP INQUIRY has 
for our understanding of group knowledge. Following Fagan (2011, 2012) 
we might distinguish two ways in which knowledge might be social: being 
the product of a social process, or being the property of a group of agents. 
GROUP INQUIRY opens the door to both kinds of social knowledge. 
When knowledge is the upshot of a group inquiry, it will be social in 
the process sense. When a group undertakes a group inquiry, its 
knowledge will be the outcome of a social process. Here the contrast is 
with a group coming to know something from an individual, as when a 
group learns something from testimony from an individual who found it 
out by herself. Individual knowledge can also be social in this sense. If 
some individual were to come to know a group’s results by reading their 
published findings, this knowledge would still be social in the sense that 
it originates in a social process (Shieber 2013, Miller 2015). Given the 
                                               
41 In Polymath projects one of the roles of the moderator is to periodically write 
up progress reports, and each project is associated with an open wiki page to 
keep track of the project. It is natural to think of these reports and the wiki as 
the scoreboard for the next stage of the project. 
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ubiquity of large-scale scientific collaborations, a considerable amount of 
our everyday knowledge is social in this sense. 
Group inquiry can also yield knowledge which is social in the sense 
that it is the property of a group. Successful inquiry changes the mental 
state of the group, and group inquiry will (if successful) yield collective 
knowledge of the answer to the object question. In many cases successful 
group inquiry will involve at least one member of the group coming to 
know the complete answer to the object question. If a group collates the 
results of its subinquiries by having one member collect and put together 
the partial answers to reach the complete answer, the upshot will be one 
member coming to know the complete answer to the object question. 
There may also be cases where group inquiry succeeds without any 
individual coming to know the complete answer to the question. If the 
process of collating the results of the subinquiries is automated, is carried 
out by multiple compilers, or academic publication suffices for compiling, 
inquiry can be successful without any member of the group coming to 
know the complete answer to the question. The UN Population study case 
provides a nice example: we are to imagine each of the members of the 
commission inquiring into subquestions of the object question what are the 
trends in world population? with the results of these subinquiries then being 
collated either by a team of collators (Tollefsen 2007: 301), or by an 
automated process (Lackey 2014: 289). In these cases, the group knowledge 
which outputs from group inquiry has a distributed or fragmented 
character, with the group knowing the answer to a question in virtue of 
members of the group knowing the answers to a suitable set of 
subquestions (see AUTHOR).  
5. Inquiry and Deep Ignorance 
One worry is that this account assumes that inquirers have the 
resources to represent the possible answers to a question. It is clearly 
possible to investigate a question without knowing what its possible 
answers are (Friedman 2013). The physics community might investigate 
the question what is the correct fundamental theory of physics? before they 
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know what kind of thing a fundamental theory of physics is.42 An adequate 
account of inquiry ought to have the resources to represent not just 
ignorance of which answer is correct, but also the kind of deep ignorance 
that occurs when we don’t know what the answers to a question are 
(Bromberger, 1992 Wilholt forthcoming), and the distinctive intellectual 
achievement involved in understanding a question.43  
We have already distinguished object questions concerning that 
relevant subject-matter from methodological questions concerning how to 
resolve an object question. I propose that we add a third kind of question: 
option questions. An option question concerns the alternatives associated 
with a particular question, and will be of the form what are the possible 
answers to Qn?, (where Qn? might be either an object or methodological 
question). An option question is a question about a question, meaning that 
each possible answer of an option question will be a set of possible answers 
to another question. If we think of an answer as a set of possible worlds, 
and of a question as a set of sets of possible worlds or a partition, an option 
question will be a set of sets of sets of worlds, or a set of partitions. 
 
 
 
                                               
42 Here I will focus on complete deep ignorance. There are a number of more 
complex cases: ignorance of some of the options, ignorance about where the 
division between options fall, and ignorance about the meaning of the terms 
used to express the question. I will also set to one side the question of how to 
think about the relation between an inquirer and the question under 
investigation in cases of deep ignorance. 
43 A related problem with the framework arises in the case of mathematical 
inquiry. Once we start thinking about mathematical questions, the possible 
worlds framework for thinking about questions gets into trouble, because 
mathematical propositions are necessarily true or false, meaning that we 
cannot represent mathematical questions as partitions over logical space. 
There are a couple of ways to get around this: i) introduce partitions over 
epistemic possibility space, , ii) allow impossible worlds into our 
metaphysical possibility space, iii) identify mathematical propositions with 
partitions over possible worlds (Pérez Carballo 2016), and then identify 
mathematical questions with sets of partitions (sets of sets of sets of worlds). 
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 Figure 3: Propositions, Questions, and Option Questions 
p: the set of worlds in which p is true (i.e. {PQR; PQr; Pqr; PqR}). 
 
Whether p?: the set of sets of worlds corresponding to the possible answers 
to the question (i.e. {{PQR; PQr; Pqr; PqR}; {pQR; pQr; pqr; pqR }}) 
 
What are the possible answers to why S?: the set of sets of sets of worlds 
corresponding to the possible sets of answers to why S?  
For the sake of simplicity I’ve only included two sets of possible 
answers, corresponding to i) whether p or not p is why S? (blue) and ii) which 
of p, r or both is why S? (orange) giving us {{{PQR; PQr; Pqr; PqR}; {pQR; 
pQr; pqr; pqR }}; {{PQR: PqR};{PQr;Pqr};{pQR; pqR}}}. 
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In a condition of deep ignorance, there may be very many ways to 
chunk up logical space to consider, and resolving an option question will 
in many cases be no mean feat. Option questions raise a host of difficult 
questions: What are the reasons for deep ignorance? How can we find out 
what the possible answers to a question might be? Can we resolve a 
question, despite not knowing what all of its possible answers are?  
6. The Division of Epistemic Labour (Again) 
For the most part, we have focused on the division of epistemic 
labour regarding the object question. However, our discussion of 
distributed scoreboards and deep ignorance helps us to see that group 
inquiry can involve different kinds of division of labour.  
The most important kinds of division are: 
1. Object question division: whereby the object question is split into 
smaller subquestions that are easier to answer; 
2. Methodological question division: whereby the methodological 
question is split up into simpler methodological questions, which 
might involve either the splitting of one method into small sub-
tasks, or different groups pursuing complementary routes to the 
same answer hoping to triangulate on one answer; 
3. Scoreboard division: whereby the members of the group distribute the 
task of representing the scoreboard; 
30 
4. Evidence division: whereby different members of the group pool 
evidence that supports an answer without clinching the matter. 
5. Option question division: whereby different members of a group 
investigate different divisions of logical space, in the interests of 
finding out what the right question is. 
 These kinds of division may occur in isolation, but my suspicion is 
that most real-world cases will involve a mix of different kinds of division 
of labour, and that much of the difficulty involved in interdisciplinary 
research involves managing these different kinds of distribution of labour, 
as well as negotiating the scoreboard of inquiry to address respects in 
which it is defective.44  
7. Conclusion 
An adequate account of group inquiry faces two challenges: the lack 
of a framework for thinking about large-scale group actions, and a lack of 
clarity about how to think about the division of epistemic labour. In the 
first part of the paper, I proposed a minimal account of group action which 
was sufficiently general to cover both large-scale and small-scale group 
actions. In the second part of the paper, I presented the Stalnaker-Roberts 
model of conversation before generalising to give an account of the 
epistemic dimension of group inquiry. Putting the two parts of the story 
together gives us an account of group inquiry that is answerable to both its 
practical and epistemic dimensions, whilst being able to account for large-
scale group inquiries, and the division of epistemic labour which they 
involve.  
In closing, I want to consider some directions for future work: 
 For the most part, we have focused on examples of large-scale group 
inquiry from science. There are a number of prominent examples of 
democratic institutions that aim to harness collective intelligence: 
                                               
44 See Wagenknecht’s ethnographically-informed discussion of opaque and 
translucent epistemic dependence (2014, 2016). Wagenknecht’s distinction is 
related to the distinction between methodological and scoreboard division, 
and (mere) object question division. 
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elections, citizens juries, public inquiries and social media (Anderson 2006, 
Landemore 2012). How might we think of these groups as group inquiries, 
and how might thinking in this way help to ameliorate democratic 
institutions?  
Providing advice for the design and conduct of collective inquiries 
ought to be a central goal for social epistemology. This paper has been 
descriptive, but it sharpens up some normative questions. When should a 
group distribute subquestions, and when should they double up on the 
same sub-questions? How should groups manage different kinds of 
division of labour? When should a group pursue multiple ways to carve 
up the same object question or multiple methodological approaches at the 
same time? 
Many philosophers of science use formal models for thinking about 
the epistemic structure of collective inquiry (See Boyer-Kassem, Mayo-
Wilson, Weisberg 2018). It would be worthwhile to consider how these 
models relate to GROUP INQUIRY, and what light this account might 
shed on the significance of normative results drawn from formal 
modelling to group inquiry. 
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